The Digital Arms Race and Today's Threat Landscape
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International Law: Intervention, Use of Force, and Armed AttackTranscriptThe player shows YouTube’s automatic captions, which are machine captions we do not review. The full transcript is below.
00:00:04Legal Cyber Academy would like to welcome you to today's program, The State of Cyber Warfare and Its Impact on Cyber Insurance.
00:00:12Today's speakers are Daniel B. Garrie, Founder of Law & Forensics, Neutral at JAMS, Adjunct Faculty at Harvard.
00:00:20Eric Jensen, Professor at Brigham Young University School of Law. Kurt Sanger, Counsel of Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, PC.
00:00:28Dr. Scott Shackelford, Professor at Indiana University Kelley School of Business.
00:00:34The program materials can be found under the Supplements tab. Thank you for joining us, and I will now turn things over to today's moderator, Daniel Garrie, for further introductions and to start the program.
00:00:45It's an honor and privilege. Little did I know when I started cyber warfare 12 years ago down this journey that it would be such a popular topic today.
00:00:55But lo and behold, my wife says that's my one rare skill. I find the most boring things that exist today in 10 years will be interesting for somebody.
00:01:05But in all seriousness, I'm going to move us right along here. I'm going to get to the disclaimer. I'm just going to read it out loud so there's no confusion.
00:01:12This is not legal advice, nor should it be considered legal advice.
00:01:15This presentation, the comments contained there, and representing the personal views of the participants as spoken, do not reflect those of their employers or clients.
00:01:24This presentation is offered for educational and informational uses. Only soliciting speakers is indeed strictly prohibited.
00:01:31However, if you want to use our contact details at the end of the presentation to follow up about questions about what we discussed or the supplemental materials or an engagement or opportunity, please do feel free.
00:01:44I only ask that if you're trying to sell a product that you don't try to sell us based on this seminar.
00:01:49So with that said, I'm going to jump right in.
00:01:52But my relevant background, I'm the editor-in-chief of the Journal of Law and Cyber Warfare.
00:01:57I occasionally advise corporations that operate at a global level on complex cyber issues that state actors are doing.
00:02:06And I basically pretend to know what I'm talking about, and they pay me a little bit of money.
00:02:11So I'm going to let Kurt, then Eric, then Scott introduce themselves in that order. Kurt, the floor is yours.
00:02:19Thanks so much, Daniel. I really appreciate you inviting me to be here today.
00:02:22Yes, I'm Kurt Sanger. I'm counsel at Buchanan, Ingersoll and Rooney.
00:02:26And I believe I am here today because I spent 23 years in the Marine Corps and because I was educated at the beginning of my career by Eric Jensen.
00:02:35But most importantly, I spent my last eight years of my career with U.S. Cyber Command.
00:02:40I had done traditional legal roles, prosecution and defense, and then in-house counseling for most of my career.
00:02:46But for those last eight years, worked on cyber operations. Thanks again, Daniel.
00:02:52Okay, and I'm Eric Talbot Jensen. As mentioned, I am a professor at Brigham University,
00:02:56and I will take full credit for everything Kurt knows, even though I had nothing to do with it.
00:03:01I also spent 20-plus years in the government with my last job as the chief international officer at the Army.
00:03:07But since then, even during then and since then, I've been doing a lot of cyber stuff as well, mostly as an academic,
00:03:13and was one of the government experts, or sorry, one of the group of experts on the talent manual,
00:03:19which was where I dealt the deepest into cyber stuff. Scott.
00:03:24Yeah, thanks so much for having me, Dan, everybody. It's a pleasure to be here.
00:03:29Scott Chappelford, so I'm a professor here at IU, which apparently is a good football team all of a sudden.
00:03:34And in addition to my work on cybersecurity and cyber policy, which has been about 15 years now, somehow,
00:03:42the time just flies, I also direct our Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research,
00:03:47which is very much focused on questions of critical infrastructure protection,
00:03:51helping out local governments, research infrastructure across the country and beyond,
00:03:56and also the Ostrom Workshop, which has been around for more than 50 years
00:04:00and is known for its work on governance, both in environmental context as well as tech.
00:04:05So great to be here. Thanks a lot.
00:04:10As always, I'm lucky to be on a panel full of people that know a lot more than me.
00:04:14So we're going to kick it off and move it right along.
00:04:19So with that said, we're going to look where we're going to cover digital arms race, cybersecurity,
00:04:24the threat landscape, what international cyber law, if any, does really exist,
00:04:30what is it and what is sort of the guiding principles.
00:04:34Overview of cyber insurance, real quick overview and then look at it.
00:04:39The issue is created by cyber war, not that the military is not interesting,
00:04:43but making sure you can be compensated by cyber attacks by state actors
00:04:47is front of mind for a lot of private corporations today as conflicts rage on.
00:04:54And then understanding maybe the war exclusion,
00:04:57because I will tell you that is becoming infinitely more complicated
00:05:02as wars and conflicts and cyber operations go everywhere.
00:05:07I will tell you as we jump right in and looking at the threat landscape,
00:05:11it's messy, it's horrible, and there's lots of efficiency here all over the world
00:05:16with cyber hackers and cyber military units coming and growing and expanding everywhere.
00:05:22You can read the mandate report, the crowd strength report.
00:05:24I'm not going to belabor it all.
00:05:27The real thing I want to talk about, and I'll let Kurt and then Eric and Scott sort of kick it off,
00:05:34is it's a digital arms race, and I want to delineate this for the audience.
00:05:38There's been no act, nobody's called a cyber war.
00:05:41There's been no called a cyber war, right?
00:05:43There's acts of war that involve the cyber theater, right?
00:05:48So there are cyber operations in the Ukraine that adjoin the kinetic attacks.
00:05:54There are integrated attacks.
00:05:56There are cyber only attacks.
00:05:58But there hasn't been a cyber declaration of war, so to speak,
00:06:01as much as there's just declarations of war.
00:06:05And that becomes really important when you look at cybersecurity insurance policies
00:06:09because they define this concept called cyber warfare
00:06:12rather than redefining warfare as being including and excluding cyber operations.
00:06:17And we'll get to that near the end of the presentation.
00:06:20But before we get to that, maybe, Kurt, you kick it off,
00:06:24and then Eric and Scott, this sort of new digital arms race,
00:06:29whether it's drones and cyber weapons and payloads and everything else,
00:06:33just to tee it up for the audience here.
00:06:35So, Scott, the floor is yours.
00:06:37And Eric, oh, sorry, Kurt, then Eric and Scott, the floor is yours.
00:06:41Kurt?
00:06:43Thanks, Daniel.
00:06:44Also, of course, technology has been used by warriors
00:06:48for unforeseen purposes for years.
00:06:51And we did not expect the internet or cyberspace
00:06:55to become a battlefield, so to speak.
00:06:58But it has become an area of intense competition internationally
00:07:03and maybe even a preferred place of competition for US adversaries
00:07:08because it's a place where they have an asymmetric advantage,
00:07:11especially considering that democracies treat information differently
00:07:17than our adversaries do.
00:07:20So, with cyberspace in particular, there are ways to affect other nations
00:07:26without crossing a line that would allow America to use its arsenal against them.
00:07:32Likewise, there's a way they can use the information
00:07:35that they can pass on the internet in a way
00:07:38to manipulate the people in the United States and other places
00:07:42where they can manipulate public understanding of conflict
00:07:47and shape the way that a population will support conflict as well.
00:07:55That's a great point.
00:07:57Yeah, those are great points.
00:07:58Let me just add to that.
00:08:00I mean, Kurt, you talk kind of in gross terms about our adversaries
00:08:05and maybe you can include frenemies in that as well.
00:08:07But you can divide those if you want between state adversaries
00:08:12and non-state adversaries, right?
00:08:14And I think they take different views to this digital arms race
00:08:19or at least they incorporate different issues.
00:08:22You've all heard of software as a service.
00:08:25You've probably also all heard of ransomware as a service.
00:08:28I mean, Daniel has in the past taken me into the dark web at times
00:08:33and it is amazing to see what services, what software services,
00:08:39ransomware services, what nefarious malware pieces
00:08:44are there for the offering for a very reasonable crisis,
00:08:47very open market for this kind of stuff.
00:08:50And I think that there's not only this digital arms race
00:08:53between state actors who are trying to use digital means
00:08:58to collect data, to gather information,
00:09:00to gain an advantage, et cetera, as Kurt was saying.
00:09:03But there's also this digital arms race in the underbelly of the world
00:09:07where you have lots of non-state actors that are creating digital tools
00:09:11that might be purchased and used by state actors
00:09:13but might also be purchased and used by transnational criminal organizations,
00:09:17by terrorist organizations, et cetera, all used to wreak havoc on the world.
00:09:22And these are things that states and corporations, by the way,
00:09:26have to be able to respond to, have to be aware of.
00:09:30And have to be able to fight against.
00:09:32So this is a huge area that is a great precursor
00:09:36to all the discussion we're going to have after this.
00:09:39Scott?
00:09:41Yeah, I mean, Eric is spot on.
00:09:43And I think Kurt stated it well, too.
00:09:45This is an increasingly crowded threat landscape.
00:09:48So we have a huge variety of groups
00:09:51that are targeting civilian critical infrastructure
00:09:54as well as during international armed conflicts,
00:09:57like we'll talk more about in the context of Ukraine
00:09:59and otherwise.
00:10:01So what we used to think of as the front lines
00:10:03don't pertain in the same way as they used to,
00:10:05which is getting us thinking in new ways
00:10:07about the role, frankly, of governments, right?
00:10:09What should the role of CISA, in our case,
00:10:11be versus Cyber Command versus just boardrooms doing their thing
00:10:15and responding to these geopolitical threats?
00:10:17And we have to be mindful of the fact that, you know,
00:10:20this is an ongoing arms race, as Daniel said.
00:10:23And on both sides of that, we see it playing out,
00:10:26including in this context of supply chain security,
00:10:28which has become a very hot topic.
00:10:30I hope we have a chance to discuss a bit.
00:10:33Yeah, always, yes, it's become good.
00:10:36And it wasn't so exciting a couple of years ago.
00:10:39You know, on the topic of dark web,
00:10:41and I'll move us forward, right,
00:10:43and foreign threat intelligence, threat landscape,
00:10:46it's varied, it's expensive.
00:10:48But here's something crazy that happened yesterday.
00:10:52And we'll talk about the key industries,
00:10:53critical infrastructure, and the supply chain.
00:10:55But yesterday, it was, or it was Monday,
00:10:59we were dealing with a situation where we basically,
00:11:02a colleague of mine reached out to me,
00:11:04and we set up a virtual machine, went on the dark web.
00:11:08We found a marketplace that buys encrypted data
00:11:11that doesn't have keys.
00:11:13And it's a dynamic price market based on the source of data.
00:11:18So you can see US government data for sale,
00:11:22fully encrypted with no keys.
00:11:25And I was shocked at the amount of,
00:11:30so they price it by the gig.
00:11:32Because they don't know what it is.
00:11:34So now it's a marketplace where they price it by the gig.
00:11:37Right, and then I thought the only people
00:11:40that could possibly be buying this data
00:11:42has got to be governments, right?
00:11:44Who's going to buy two bucks a gig,
00:11:47Department of Agriculture, whatever,
00:11:49and there's 600 gigs, whatever, you know.
00:11:53So it went from two bucks to $1,500 a gig.
00:11:56And who's going to have the resources to try
00:11:58and say we're going to invest enough
00:12:00in this encrypted stuff to break it, right?
00:12:03I mean, it's got to be someone who is persistent
00:12:06and has resources.
00:12:08Yeah, but I'm like, so that just gives you context.
00:12:12I'd seen a lot of marketplaces,
00:12:14but this was the first time I'd ever seen,
00:12:16I'd seen private bartering,
00:12:18but I'd never seen a commercial dynamic marketplace
00:12:22for selling encrypted data.
00:12:24But I guess it makes eventual sense, right?
00:12:27I mean, it eventually, right?
00:12:29I mean, if people's backups work and all you get
00:12:31is a bunch of data that's fully encrypted
00:12:33because it's data at rest, I mean,
00:12:35got to make money somehow.
00:12:37So you don't pay the right actors.
00:12:39Because they don't have to de-encrypt it, right?
00:12:41All they have to do is get the data.
00:12:42So they do the easy part of the transaction.
00:12:45Well, that's what I thought too.
00:12:46But apparently, like, there's some data stores
00:12:48that are fully encrypted, even data at rest,
00:12:51and data in transit, and I don't know.
00:12:54I always surprise at the dynamic marketplace of it all.
00:12:57I mean, the threat actors are dynamic and varied.
00:13:00I've seen, you know, Brazilians,
00:13:02Canadian, Chinese, Russians,
00:13:05Indonesians, Turkish,
00:13:07I'm trying to think who else I've seen this year
00:13:09that's been particularly.
00:13:13I've seen some European countries.
00:13:16They were probably caught somewhere
00:13:18where they weren't supposed to be.
00:13:21Paraguayan.
00:13:23So we're seeing a more robust and dynamic landscape
00:13:26hitting the private sector.
00:13:28I don't know, Kurt or Scott or Eric in that order,
00:13:31if there's anything you want to add,
00:13:33sort of what you guys are seeing.
00:13:35I mean, we'll talk more about, you know,
00:13:37I mean, I've seen every sector.
00:13:39I mean, I've seen it.
00:13:41Sorry, two quick things on that.
00:13:43The number one thing I'd advise everyone
00:13:45is that you need to protect spaces
00:13:47that you think are well protected right now,
00:13:49because someday someone will be able
00:13:51to crack that information
00:13:53so you can't consider it locked down.
00:13:55The second thing I want to mention is that
00:13:57the first five years of my medical records are missing,
00:14:00so if anybody finds those after going through these things,
00:14:04I really appreciate it.
00:14:05I tell people, like, it's so frustrating to me.
00:14:08People steal my medical records,
00:14:10and I'm like, I can't get my doctor
00:14:12to get my medical records from the other doctor,
00:14:14but the criminal can steal them
00:14:15and sell them to somebody, and I'm like,
00:14:17what's going on?
00:14:18Like, at least give me a medical system
00:14:20where my doctor's treatment can actually be shared
00:14:22with the other doctor and doesn't require me
00:14:24to go get a DVD, put it on a DVD,
00:14:27take it over to the other office,
00:14:28and like, take a half a day.
00:14:30I'm like, they rip you off.
00:14:31They steal all my data.
00:14:33I can buy it on the dark web,
00:14:34but you can't get it into your medical...
00:14:36Sorry, it's just...
00:14:37I can see that you guys just hire somebody to get it.
00:14:39Come on, you know all the right people.
00:14:40Just hire somebody to get it.
00:14:42I've actually bought my data on the dark web,
00:14:44multiple times.
00:14:45See?
00:14:46Yeah, yeah, yeah.
00:14:47But if you're a thief and you're tuned into this,
00:14:49I just say have the courtesy to share it with your victim.
00:14:52I know you're going to do something terrible with it,
00:14:54but please...
00:14:55Yeah, but you know how hard it is
00:14:56to get your medical records?
00:14:57It's not that easy.
00:14:59That's funny.
00:15:00That's weird.
00:15:01Absolutely.
00:15:02Sorry, I'm just venting.
00:15:03It's like I'm happy.
00:15:04No, vent away.
00:15:05No, because I work in New York and in Utah
00:15:08and in Oregon and in California and Washington,
00:15:11and the doctors don't have connected medical systems
00:15:14that maybe in the Northeast they can share,
00:15:17but Northeast to California or to Washington State,
00:15:20they're like, I got a...
00:15:22Oh, don't want to get me started.
00:15:24Anyways, go ahead, Scott, and then Eric, if you want to add.
00:15:28Oh, yeah.
00:15:29No, no, no worries.
00:15:30Just a quick note.
00:15:31I mean, absolutely.
00:15:32All these sectors are at risk, right?
00:15:34For the viewers, I think it's important to keep in mind
00:15:36that what we count as critical infrastructure
00:15:38is a little bit in the eye of the beholder.
00:15:40So it does vary, right?
00:15:42Country by country and region by region quite a bit.
00:15:44Here in the US, we have 16 sectors.
00:15:47That's not the same in the EU, which is seven.
00:15:50And even what we count as something really critical
00:15:53as we're recording this, elections, right?
00:15:55That's not critical across the board.
00:15:57There's only a handful of countries still
00:15:59that recognize elections and election infrastructure
00:16:01as critical.
00:16:03So that's just the first step across the board.
00:16:05Democracy isn't the same everywhere.
00:16:06Well, that's it.
00:16:07That's it.
00:16:08But even among our across the EU and across NATO countries,
00:16:12there's only a handful that have actually added it.
00:16:16And we did, what, was it 2017?
00:16:18So I mean, it does vary a little bit.
00:16:20That's not to say that's the whole story,
00:16:22because that designation, of course, especially in the US,
00:16:24doesn't come necessarily with a lot
00:16:26if there's not a separate sector-specific law
00:16:28to help really kind of regulate
00:16:30what those baseline cybersecurity requirements might be.
00:16:34But even taking that first step is important.
00:16:36So as you think about how this works, especially globally,
00:16:39I think it's useful to think through, well,
00:16:41where are those areas of our greatest convergence, basically?
00:16:46Daniel, I have some questions, some points on this,
00:16:48but can you go back one slide?
00:16:50Yeah, of course.
00:16:56So I think this kind of goes
00:16:58to what we were talking about before.
00:17:01We all know that the National Defense Authorization Act
00:17:04in 2019 pointed out that the new axis
00:17:07of evil, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, right?
00:17:10But I think the point we were making before that is that
00:17:12even though these may be the big fellas on the block,
00:17:16we know that Israel is also deeply involved
00:17:19in this kind of stuff.
00:17:20We know that there are also lots of non-state actors
00:17:22who are deeply involved in this kind of stuff.
00:17:24So we can't be too myopic in our decision
00:17:28to defend ourselves.
00:17:30And I mean, let's be honest,
00:17:31the United States is involved in this stuff as well, right,
00:17:34trying to gather data and information.
00:17:36So from a corporate standpoint,
00:17:38I think you just have to be very aware that everything,
00:17:42the threat, when we say threat landscape,
00:17:44we tend to think of only those, the axis of evil,
00:17:47but you're at threat at risk
00:17:49from lots of different areas out there.
00:17:51All right, can you move polls forward there, Daniel?
00:17:53I just want to say one more thing about the slide
00:17:56that we were on before,
00:17:58and that is with the critical infrastructure.
00:18:00I mean, we all know, if you're reading the news,
00:18:02that last week the White House
00:18:04established a special commission
00:18:06just to deal with recent Chinese hacks
00:18:09or supposed Chinese hacks, including critical infrastructure.
00:18:12I mean, this stuff is at a level now
00:18:15where it's almost a mutual assured destruction scenario,
00:18:20where everybody's in everybody's stuff,
00:18:23and you have to be so agile to kick people out,
00:18:27to keep people out, et cetera.
00:18:29It's a real issue.
00:18:32Well, I think you wanted better.
00:18:34I'm saying it's complicated
00:18:40because we're looking through a US-centric view,
00:18:45but what I'm seeing increasingly
00:18:47is that at a global theater of operations,
00:18:50we're having companies that operate in Australia,
00:18:54their US interests.
00:18:56They're not wholly owned subsidiaries,
00:18:58but there's a substantial US interest
00:19:00in the Australian entity,
00:19:02and they're dealing with really large threats
00:19:04from the Asia Pacific,
00:19:07and they may have a joint venture,
00:19:09and how do you secure that?
00:19:11That may provide critical infrastructure,
00:19:14and I think, Scott, you alluded to the supply chain
00:19:16being important, right?
00:19:18Well, I think two years ago,
00:19:21I became a CMMC A-B Assessor.
00:19:23I think that's what they call them,
00:19:25and now it's all official, this CMMC thing or whatever,
00:19:29and we'll see how it progresses or evolves,
00:19:32but I think the most interesting
00:19:34or challenging thing about this is critical,
00:19:36and I think, Kurt, this was your point.
00:19:38Critical infrastructure and for Eric
00:19:41is different in every country,
00:19:43so it's kind of challenging
00:19:46for when you have US-centric views
00:19:48and you're trying to operate in the Australian theater.
00:19:50Luckily, they speak English
00:19:52and share some of the same views and values,
00:19:54but the critical infrastructure designations
00:19:57and the resources you get for a corporation will vary,
00:20:00but the countries, the state attacking countries,
00:20:03meaning the flip side, your adversary, they don't care.
00:20:07I don't know.
00:20:09I tell private corporations,
00:20:12I go, it's like a couple hackers,
00:20:14and I go, no, they have a skyscraper of hackers,
00:20:17and they're just dedicated to this industry.
00:20:20They have a wing of buildings
00:20:23that are just focused on this sector, this area,
00:20:27and the magnitude and the complexity that plays out,
00:20:31and they're like, oh, well, it's war,
00:20:33and I'm like, no, it's not war.
00:20:36Daniel, one other point on that,
00:20:38and we'll get into this later,
00:20:40but with respect to international law,
00:20:42when you see this critical infrastructure stuff happening,
00:20:45there's very little international law.
00:20:48Well, that's what I've come to appreciate.
00:20:50There is no international law
00:20:52outside of some nuclear statutes,
00:20:54and there are just treaties about nuclear proliferation
00:20:57and have nothing to do with actually securing
00:20:59nuclear infrastructure.
00:21:00It has to do with training nuclear waste and stuff,
00:21:03which is not helpful at all,
00:21:05but the point being is that,
00:21:07so let's talk about international law,
00:21:09so Professor Jensen, I ain't even going to pretend,
00:21:12so why don't you walk us through
00:21:14sort of the international law here,
00:21:17and I say it depends,
00:21:18but maybe you can walk us through at a high level
00:21:20what we're working at,
00:21:21and then Scott, and then Kurt,
00:21:23if you have anything you want to add into that,
00:21:25but feel free, and I can go ahead,
00:21:29I can advance the slides, a couple slides,
00:21:31if you want to walk us through a couple of them.
Automatically generated; it may contain errors.
Lesson notes
Opens with today's cyber threat landscape, including how stolen data is bought and sold on illicit markets, then sets up the international law questions that follow.
Study materials
Notes, flashcards and practice questions for this lesson, reviewed before publication.
Study notes
Cyber operations in war versus a "cyber war"
No one has declared a cyber war. There are acts of war that involve the cyber theater: cyber operations in Ukraine that accompany kinetic attacks, integrated attacks and cyber-only attacks. But there has been no "cyber declaration of war," only declarations of war. The distinction matters for insurance, because policies define a concept called cyber warfare rather than defining warfare to include or exclude cyber operations.
Why cyberspace favors U.S. adversaries
Warriors have always repurposed technology, and no one expected the internet to become a battlefield. It has become an area of intense international competition and perhaps the preferred arena for U.S. adversaries, because they hold an asymmetric advantage there:
- Democracies treat information differently than authoritarian adversaries do.
- Cyber operations can affect other nations without crossing the line that would allow the United States to use its military arsenal in response.
- Information spread online can manipulate public understanding of a conflict and shape whether a population supports it.
A digital arms race among states and criminals
The arms race runs on two tracks:
- State actors use digital means to collect data, gather information and gain advantage.
- Non-state actors build and sell tools in an open underground market. Just as there is software as a service, there is ransomware as a service, with malware offered at reasonable prices. Buyers include states, transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups.
The panel described a dark web marketplace selling encrypted data without keys, priced by the gigabyte according to its source. Prices for some U.S. government data rose from a couple of dollars to $1,500 a gigabyte, suggesting well-resourced buyers, likely governments, willing to invest in breaking the encryption. The lesson: protect even data you consider well protected, because someday someone may be able to decrypt it.
Threat actors come from many countries. The 2019 National Defense Authorization Act highlighted Russia, China, Iran and North Korea, but other states, non-state actors and even allies conduct cyber operations, so companies should not take too narrow a view of who might target them. Major state actors maintain large, dedicated teams focused on particular sectors, not a couple of hackers.
Critical infrastructure differs by country
What counts as critical infrastructure is partly in the eye of the beholder:
- The United States designates 16 sectors; the EU designates seven.
- The U.S. designated election infrastructure as critical in 2017, but only a handful of countries treat elections that way.
- A designation does not by itself impose baseline security requirements unless a sector-specific law does.
Companies operating globally, such as U.S.-linked entities in Australia facing Asia-Pacific threats through joint ventures, must navigate different designations and government resources, while state attackers ignore those distinctions. Supply chain security has become a central concern, reflected in programs such as CMMC for the defense industrial base. Intrusions into critical infrastructure are now so widespread that the situation resembles mutual assured destruction, with everyone inside everyone else's systems.
New front lines for government and boardrooms
Because so many groups target civilian critical infrastructure, including during international armed conflicts, the old idea of front lines no longer fits. That raises questions about the respective roles of CISA, Cyber Command and corporate boards in responding to geopolitical threats. International law offers little specific protection for critical infrastructure, leaving companies to manage much of the risk themselves.
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