Legal Cyber Academy

Hostile or Warlike Action: Attribution and Coverage Disputes

Free. Watch without an account. Sign in to save progress and take the exam.

Up next

Sign in to take the examPass it for a verifiable Certificate of Completion

Then

TranscriptThe player shows YouTube’s automatic captions, which are machine captions we do not review. The full transcript is below.

00:00:00And I'm like, the debate is,

00:00:03and I'd love to hear you guys thought,

00:00:05is what is a cyber hostile or warlike action?

00:00:10It's literally, this is what it comes down to, right?

00:00:13Because the policy exclusion applies to any hostile or warlike action.

00:00:18What is a cyber hostile action or warlike action

00:00:22versus a non-cyber, what does a non-cyber warlike action look like?

00:00:27And what does a non-cyber hostile action look like?

00:00:31This is the part I've heard lots of legal argument on.

00:00:36It is the mediator.

00:00:37I'd love to hear what you guys think here.

00:00:40I mean, because this is literally a million,

00:00:43eight, nine figures comes into play about coverage.

00:00:46I mean, because, and it's literally those three words

00:00:49and then another half a dozen words and that's where it all rests

00:00:53because people argue that it was a cyber hostile action.

00:00:57I'm like, okay, it was a cyber action and it was hostile.

00:01:00Yes.

00:01:01And then to Kurt, to your point,

00:01:03like how do you know it's not two 16 year old kids in the basement

00:01:06hanging out that are like in the Ukrainian village hanging out.

00:01:10I'm like, they're like, well, they're war.

00:01:12I'm like, okay.

00:01:14I mean, so that, you know, there's,

00:01:16but I'd love to hear your guys's thought here

00:01:18because this is the problem facing corporations, right?

00:01:20I mean, that are like out because Ukraine up until the war

00:01:24was a huge software outsourced development area, like huge, right?

00:01:29And so we're seeing disputes come out of the conflict.

00:01:34The conflict I know has been happening for a couple of years.

00:01:36Believe it or not, it takes so long.

00:01:38The law doesn't work as quickly as the conflict.

00:01:42So the invasion happened.

00:01:44XYZ claims are asserted.

00:01:46Things are filed.

00:01:47I'd love to hear your guys's thought here because this is really,

00:01:50you know, doesn't matter that the invasion happened

00:01:54if the cyber act happened before the invasion or after the invasion

00:01:58or there wasn't actually an invasion according to one side.

00:02:02There was a skirmish.

00:02:03So I don't know.

00:02:04I'd love to hear what, you know, what your guys's thoughts are here.

00:02:07Maybe we can hear Kurt, then Scott, and then Eric,

00:02:10and then we can wrap up here.

00:02:12Kurt.

00:02:13Yeah.

00:02:14So when a pitcher with the World Series in a couple of days,

00:02:17put it this way.

00:02:19Oh, it's me.

00:02:20Can you hear me?

00:02:21Yep, we can hear you.

00:02:22We're good.

00:02:23All right.

00:02:24So with the World Series coming up in a couple of days

00:02:26with a pitcher throwing a pitch by the time the catcher catches it

00:02:29before the umpire makes a call,

00:02:32it's just the pitch.

00:02:34But then the umpire is going to call it a ball or a strike.

00:02:37Right.

00:02:38And then it'll be a ball or a strike.

00:02:40For war, it's really a political decision.

00:02:44Almost quarterly, for much of my time at Cyber Command,

00:02:47we get a congressional inquiry that would basically say,

00:02:51what is a cyber act of war or something to that effect?

00:02:55And that would come from a senior staffer.

00:02:57And my answer within the office,

00:02:59I wouldn't send it back this way, but I'd say,

00:03:01basically, that's your boss's decision,

00:03:04because it's Congress that declares war.

00:03:06So what that action is and whether it fits under the definition of war

00:03:11and whether that action should be justification for a nation to go to war,

00:03:16that's a political choice.

00:03:18There are legal components to that answer.

00:03:21But ultimately, that's a political decision.

00:03:24And then, yeah, insurers have to make a separate decision,

00:03:29but they're going by a separate definition.

00:03:31And that's why I thought the Tyler manual,

00:03:35while again, being a useful frame of reference,

00:03:38it wasn't totally useful to the insurance community

00:03:41because it just wasn't the same type of activity

00:03:46that would normally fall under the war exclusion.

00:03:50Yeah, I think there's several interrelated issues here,

00:03:56which I know is the challenging part for you as a mediator, Daniel,

00:04:00but also just others at the front lines are dealing with these challenges.

00:04:04I mean, there's issues around attribution.

00:04:07How much confidence do we want to give X country

00:04:10in attributing a cyber attack back?

00:04:12Maybe it's one thing if it's the US government.

00:04:15Others have been known to make some errors in attributing attacks.

00:04:19And it's not like even the US government does the equivalent of showing our work.

00:04:23There's legitimate concerns about burning intelligence sources,

00:04:26human and otherwise.

00:04:28So there's some trust us going on there, right?

00:04:31And what if it's a group like Citizen Lab out of Toronto

00:04:33that's doing the attribution?

00:04:35So I think there's issues surrounding that.

00:04:37There's issues surrounding what if it's a non-state actor

00:04:39that's been fingered but with deep ties to a given government,

00:04:43which gets us into all the state responsibility stuff.

00:04:47And then as was pointed out just a moment ago,

00:04:49there's issues around how different countries politically treat these things, right?

00:04:53There's red lines depending on the administration in charge, right?

00:04:57And for subsequent US administrations, we've pretty much said,

00:05:00absolutely, you know, any cyber attack on civil and critical infrastructure,

00:05:04we have the right to reasonably respond to in a variety of different ways.

00:05:09Other countries kind of draw those lines differently.

00:05:12And even here in the US, how we've done that in practice is really very, right?

00:05:15Look at the Sony breach, you know, compared to JP Morgan and otherwise.

00:05:18So I mean, it's tough.

00:05:21I get it.

00:05:22From the private specter perspective,

00:05:24because you're seeing, you know, policy and international law here,

00:05:26evolve in real time.

00:05:29So I would love to give you like one quick answer otherwise.

00:05:32But in my mind, at least, those are some of the main variables,

00:05:34at least to keep in mind as folks are thinking through, you know,

00:05:37how to craft these policies more specifically.

00:05:42I want to go back to your point.

00:05:44I agree with everything that Kurt and Scott have said, obviously.

00:05:46Those are key points.

00:05:47I want to go back to your point about hostile threat or warlike act, Daniel.

00:05:53And I think that, you know, asking the lawyers to define that is only going

00:05:57to be semi-useful because of the points that Kurt and Scott have been making.

00:06:01These are government decisions.

00:06:04And even though the lawyers can dissect what the government says and does

00:06:08in various instances, ultimately, these are political decisions.

00:06:11And we just don't have enough, I think, we don't have enough data

00:06:15right now because of government's hesitance to speak up and attribute

00:06:20not just to somebody, but characterize that action until governments

00:06:25will start to characterize these actions under international law.

00:06:29It's hard for us to give good advice to insurance companies and say,

00:06:33this is what those words really mean.

00:06:36Yeah, I will tell you it is extremely complicated because when you have

00:06:42a U.S. company relying on Ukrainian software developer with,

00:06:49that's a subsidiary of a larger European company which contracted

00:06:53the software development through them, but it was in Ukraine.

00:06:57There's an armed, you know, is it an armed conflict?

00:07:00The Ukrainian government certainly called it an armed conflict.

00:07:03The Russian government did not call it, they called it, I forget,

00:07:07they used a very narrow term, and then the United States has not weighed in

00:07:12if it's been a declaration of actual war, I don't think.

00:07:16Officially, they haven't officially said it because that's how we're giving.

00:07:21I don't fully get it all.

00:07:22I remember reading the briefs thinking like, they're splitting hairs

00:07:27about giving weapons systems somehow that got bought.

00:07:31But then I'm just like thinking like, this is a nine figure claim,

00:07:34someone's going to provide some clarity here, or you're going to take,

00:07:38I mean, nobody's taken that to trial just because there's nobody wants

00:07:45to end up on the New Jersey side of the law, but it is a lot of money

00:07:49and there's a lot of ambiguity, right?

00:07:52Because a hostile act, what is the difference between a state cyber

00:07:56hostile act and a cyber hostile act, and who knows who's doing what, right?

00:08:02And I think it becomes inherently complicated when you have different

00:08:06countries just given the global nature of how commerce works.

00:08:10It becomes a lot more complicated because one side is pointing to the Ukrainian

00:08:14government statements, the other side is pointing to the lack thereof

00:08:17of other countries and usually doesn't identify the United States

00:08:22government has to make the state under declaration, it just says a declaration.

00:08:27And now you'll see an insurance policies in 2025.

00:08:30Let's assure who needs to make the declaration.

00:08:33I promise you that language is coming as well.

00:08:37So it will be very telling, but I do appreciate everybody taking the time

00:08:43out of their very busy day to try to keep us as close to on time

00:08:46as possible. I thank you all very much and I wish you all a great

00:08:50rest of your day.

00:08:52Stay safe and have fun. Bye.

00:08:54Thanks very much.

Automatically generated; it may contain errors.

Lesson notes

Examines what counts as a hostile or warlike action under a war exclusion, why attribution is so difficult, and how coverage disputes can turn on a few words, with examples tied to the war in Ukraine.

Study materials

Notes, flashcards and practice questions for this lesson, reviewed before publication.

Study notes

Why "hostile or warlike action" decides large coverage disputes

Cyber policy exclusions often turn on a handful of words: whether a loss arose from a "hostile or warlike action." Claims worth many millions of dollars can rest on how those words are read. The hard questions include:

  • What distinguishes a cyber hostile or warlike action from a non-cyber one?
  • Is a cyber operation hostile just because it was a cyber action and it caused harm?
  • How do you know the attack was not launched by a couple of teenagers in a basement rather than a state?

The Russia-Ukraine conflict illustrates the problem. Ukraine was a major hub for outsourced software development, and disputes are now emerging from that conflict. Litigation moves much more slowly than conflict, so claims filed after the invasion are still working through the system. Timing questions add complexity: did the cyber act occur before or after the invasion, and does it matter if one side calls the fighting a war and the other calls it something narrower?

War is a political characterization, not just a legal one

A useful analogy is a baseball pitch: until the umpire calls it, it is just a pitch. Whether a cyber action is an "act of war" is ultimately a political decision. In the United States it is Congress that declares war, so congressional questions about what counts as a cyber act of war are, in the end, questions for Congress itself. There are legal components to the answer, but the characterization is political.

Insurers make a separate decision under their own policy definitions. That is why the Tallinn Manual, while a useful frame of reference, is not fully useful to the insurance community: it addresses different questions from those a war exclusion raises.

Attribution and state responsibility complicate coverage

Several interrelated variables shape these disputes:

  • Confidence in attribution. How much weight should a court give to a particular country's attribution? Some governments have made attribution errors, and even the U.S. government rarely "shows its work," in part to protect intelligence sources.
  • Who attributes. Attribution may come from a research group, such as Citizen Lab in Toronto, rather than a government.
  • Non-state actors with state ties. A group with deep ties to a government raises questions of state responsibility.
  • Political red lines. Countries, and different U.S. administrations, draw lines differently. U.S. administrations have said they may respond to cyber attacks on civilian critical infrastructure, yet responses in practice, such as to the Sony and JPMorgan breaches, have varied.

Lawyers can parse government statements, but until governments characterize cyber operations under international law more consistently, there is too little data to tell insurers what the policy words really mean.

A cross-border example and the coming policy language

Consider a U.S. company relying on a Ukrainian software developer that is a subsidiary of a European company that contracted the work. Ukraine called the fighting an armed conflict, Russia used a narrower term, and the United States had not officially declared it a war. In such disputes, one side points to Ukraine's statements while the other points to the absence of declarations by other countries. Because policies often refer to "a declaration" without saying whose, insurers are likely to add language specifying which government must make it. Given the ambiguity, few parties want to take these cases to trial, especially after the New Jersey NotPetya ruling went against the insurer.

Flashcards

9 cards. Test your recall, then flip to check.

Select the card, or press Space, to flip it. Left and right arrow keys move between cards.

1 of 9

Practice quiz

Practice — not graded, not the final exam

Question 1 of 5A policy excludes losses from 'hostile or warlike action.' Which question is hardest for a mediator to resolve?
Choose an answer to check it.