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Private-Sector Exposure and the Tallinn Manual

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00:00:00But I mean, ultimately in the United States,

00:00:02the private sector is the one bearing the brunt of this.

00:00:04Ultimately, at the end of the day,

00:00:06the United States private corporations,

00:00:08the DOD isn't like,

00:00:09I'm going to give you a grant

00:00:10to increase your cyber defense budget, right?

00:00:12That is not happening, right?

00:00:14Even though they're being expected

00:00:15to have a robust cybersecurity platform,

00:00:18and I know Kurt, he has an excellent,

00:00:20he has a team, his colleague,

00:00:21they work preventively to help corporations understand this,

00:00:25which is something they critically need to do.

00:00:28Because if you don't do it, let me promise you,

00:00:30the only people that get sued is the board and the company.

00:00:34Right, that's it.

00:00:35But anyways, Professor Jensen,

00:00:36you want to walk us through the law of armed conflict

00:00:39and sort of how that interplays with the other pieces.

00:00:41And if you want to touch on the new,

00:00:43UNICEF law that North Korea nor Iran participated in,

00:00:46everything will be ready.

00:00:47All right, so can you just take me back one slide,

00:00:50just for one quick note, Daniel,

00:00:52and this is the 2015, there's a bit of a typo there.

00:00:55Yeah, I saw it, 2020, 2015.

00:00:58The thing about that is,

00:00:59we were talking about critical infrastructure.

00:01:01This statement about you can't mess

00:01:04with critical infrastructure was signed

00:01:06by all the big powers who are right now engaged

00:01:09in messing with people's critical infrastructure.

00:01:11All of them, like, rampantly.

00:01:13Right, so I mean,

00:01:14we all know that the UNGG comments

00:01:16don't make international law.

00:01:18And so no state actually committed by signing this

00:01:21that they would not do it.

00:01:22But the point is you have these crossing interests

00:01:27where no state wants their critical infrastructure

00:01:29to be at risk,

00:01:30but every state wants to put their adversaries'

00:01:32critical infrastructure at risk.

00:01:34And it's going to eventually come to a head,

00:01:38and I don't know what it's going to look like, what it does.

00:01:40It may look like armed conflict, so Daniel,

00:01:42if you'll advance me one slide.

00:01:44The normal international law rules

00:01:46that we just talked about, prohibited intervention,

00:01:48the use of force, armed attack,

00:01:50those things apply during peacetime.

00:01:53And of course,

00:01:54you have to overlay that human rights law as well,

00:01:56which protects individual rights,

00:01:58doesn't protect states,

00:01:59but protects the members of states,

00:02:01the citizens of states.

00:02:02But at some point,

00:02:04this cyber stuff may initiate

00:02:06or certainly will become part of an armed conflict.

00:02:08And we already see that in the armed conflict

00:02:11in Russia and Ukraine.

00:02:12Both of those states are deeply engaged

00:02:14in cyber activities as part of armed conflict.

00:02:17We see that in Israel and Palestine.

00:02:19We see that even in places like Myanmar and Sudan

00:02:21and places like that where these armed conflicts are going on.

00:02:24The cyber operations are playing a role

00:02:27in all of those armed conflicts now.

00:02:29The key point to this slide is that

00:02:32within an armed conflict,

00:02:33once an armed conflict happens,

00:02:36which means an armed conflict, again, is a term of art,

00:02:39which we define with some legal parameters.

00:02:42It's more than rioting and problems like that.

00:02:45It's more than domestic unrest.

00:02:47But it can be between a state

00:02:49and a non-state actor within that state

00:02:51or a non-state actor outside that state

00:02:54or between two states.

00:02:55All of those things could be armed conflict.

00:02:58Once you're in armed conflict,

00:03:00then another set of law comes in

00:03:02and overlies what you're doing

00:03:05and sits on top of whatever existing law you're applying,

00:03:08such as the law of peace.

00:03:10And that law of armed conflict regulates armed conflict

00:03:14in all ways, including cyber aspects of armed conflict.

00:03:18Now, there are people out there who think

00:03:20that the law of armed conflict is insufficient

00:03:22to deal with new types of technology,

00:03:24such as virology, cyber technology,

00:03:27artificial intelligence, robotics,

00:03:29human enhancement, things like that.

00:03:31I'm not that way.

00:03:33I believe that the law of armed conflict,

00:03:35though we can massage it on the edges,

00:03:37has all the principles necessary

00:03:39to govern cyber operations in the law of armed conflict.

00:03:43And we do that through these principles

00:03:45at the very bottom of this slide,

00:03:47the principle of military necessity,

00:03:49the distinction, proportionality, and unnecessary suffering.

00:03:51These are principles that are part of the law of armed conflict

00:03:54that should guide our cyber operations.

00:03:56Once again, I've talked too much.

00:03:58Scott, Kurt, go.

00:04:03No, not at all. This is terrific.

00:04:05So, yeah, no, I would just point out,

00:04:08and forcefully agree, for sure.

00:04:12I mean, all of these countries did sign up

00:04:14for those 11 cyber norms that we'll talk about,

00:04:16including protecting civilian critical infrastructure.

00:04:18But the same could be said for way back.

00:04:20There was that cybersecurity code of conduct,

00:04:23for example, between the US and China

00:04:25under the theft of intellectual property,

00:04:27as you were talking about earlier, Daniel.

00:04:29The 2014 scam.

00:04:30Exactly.

00:04:31That didn't exactly last very long.

00:04:32And China, of course,

00:04:33was negotiated similar deals with Australia,

00:04:36lots of other countries,

00:04:37and it was squarely around that topic.

00:04:40So, as we were just hearing about from Eric,

00:04:43the key thing, as we'll talk more about,

00:04:45is going to be enforcement for those norms,

00:04:48for these agreements, both in wartime and peacetime,

00:04:52when we talk about violating these norms

00:04:54and what impact this new cybercrime convention is going to have,

00:04:57which, again, it's quite contentious,

00:05:00in part because of just how freaking broad it is.

00:05:03It's not just focusing on ransomware.

00:05:06We're basically talking about, in some ways,

00:05:08criminalizing the use of technology in some contexts itself.

00:05:12And that's why there was such pushback

00:05:14from the US and the EU and others,

00:05:16but it's adopted and it's going to have an impact.

00:05:21So, we shouldn't think about this necessarily

00:05:24as a straight line, for sure,

00:05:27towards something like cyber piece.

00:05:28There's going to be fits and starts along the way.

00:05:31And, at least in my mind,

00:05:34this is not necessarily a step forward.

00:05:36It could be a half step back.

00:05:38So, we can talk more about that patchwork that we have

00:05:41as we go through,

00:05:42but I just wanted to note that really quick.

00:05:46Daniel, can you go back one slide real quick to the UNGGE?

00:05:50So, yeah, just on that second bullet there,

00:05:52it should note that the GGE did not prohibit

00:06:00attacks on critical infrastructure.

00:06:02It prohibited attacks on critical infrastructure

00:06:05that are contrary to obligations under international law.

00:06:10So, if you feel, if you are a nation

00:06:12and you feel you are acting lawfully,

00:06:14that is not a restraint.

00:06:15If we pull on that thread,

00:06:17the entire worldwide web might come unraveled,

00:06:20so I'm going to leave it right there.

00:06:22But the other thing I want to mention,

00:06:23going back a little bit early in the conversation,

00:06:26what cyber operations can do in the context of conflict

00:06:30and in an armed conflict,

00:06:32not armed conflict and conflict.

00:06:36A nation can now target an individual

00:06:40or an organization that is not participating in the conflict,

00:06:45so to speak, that they are not a normal target.

00:06:48So, if you feel that the meals that are sent to the troops

00:06:54that are developed in the middle of Kansas,

00:06:57say they're being shipped to support the troops in Ukraine right now,

00:07:02it used to be years ago that you couldn't really touch them

00:07:05from another nation unless you committed the use of armed force.

00:07:10But now they can be affected from a distance,

00:07:12and they can be affected from a distance

00:07:14in a way that has a strategic impact

00:07:17who escalated from meals to weapons components.

00:07:21You can affect the development of those weapons components,

00:07:25make it more difficult for the fighters in Ukraine to fight

00:07:28because they don't have those components,

00:07:31and it's all done at a level where there's not really

00:07:34a straight answer with regard to what you can do

00:07:37in response to that type of activity.

00:07:41Yeah, I think that's a very set of statements.

00:07:47So, I mean, I think the interesting part is it's changing.

00:07:52We have the talent manual,

00:07:53and it's just a bunch of experts that got together

00:07:56that it's fairly definitive, or it's sort of like a restatement sort of.

00:08:02It should have probably been retitled as a restatement,

00:08:04but the point being is that it's really a summary

00:08:07of different view of the laws and so on and so forth.

00:08:11And I'll let Professor Jensen you weigh in here.

00:08:14But one of the most complicated things for a private corporation

00:08:17trying to figure this out is when you operate

00:08:20in the global environment, you're bound by the state laws,

00:08:24the laws of the state you're operating your business in.

00:08:28And then you're bound by the laws upon which

00:08:30the state you're incorporated in.

00:08:33And sometimes they're in direct conflict with each other.

00:08:36Like, for example, in China, if you operate in China,

00:08:39the Chinese government comes in.

00:08:41I can't go back to China, but there was somebody in China

00:08:46or whatever had a company in China,

00:08:48and they were operating there, right?

00:08:50And the Chinese government comes in and says,

00:08:52I want access to all of your source code

00:08:54and everything else, and you can't tell anybody about it

00:08:56or we'll put you in jail.

00:08:59That's a red surprise because in the United States

00:09:02you may be mandatory required to disclose,

00:09:06depending on if you have a government contract,

00:09:09that contact and that requirement under DFARS

00:09:13or under the federal contract vehicle you're operating on,

00:09:17you may be required to disclose that the Chinese government

00:09:20came and demanded all of that and failure to disclose

00:09:22that can be a crime.

00:09:24So then your employee that's sitting in their office

00:09:27in China is like, what am I supposed to do now?

00:09:29I just want to collect a paycheck.

00:09:32Or she wants to just collect a paycheck,

00:09:35and they're like, great.

00:09:36I'm in the middle of an international law problem.

00:09:38They're like, I didn't sign up for this.

00:09:40And so they're like, I'm going to fly home.

00:09:43I'm going home.

00:09:44But I think that this is happening more and more.

00:09:48A lot of U.S. executives, and I mentioned this because

00:09:50there are a substantial number of U.S. executives

00:09:53that at this point aren't allowed out of China.

00:09:57China has taken their passport and visa

00:10:00and they're effectively guests to the government of China.

00:10:04And there's concern among the U.S. government

00:10:08that these executives, these high-level U.S. business executives

00:10:12may have been compromised and compelled to grant

00:10:15or give access to certain things,

00:10:18or the Chinese government is concerned

00:10:20that they have obtained access to Chinese state secrets

00:10:23and the Chinese government's going to hold them there.

00:10:26And so it's a very complicated situation.

00:10:29So I don't know, Professor Jensen,

00:10:31and then maybe Scott and Kurt, you want to weigh in,

00:10:34and then we'll jump into the next section here.

00:10:36Well, I mean, you know, Daniel,

00:10:38I can just echo all that stuff you just said,

00:10:41including the risks and the thought processes

00:10:43that have to go on.

00:10:44Before we move off the talent manual slide,

00:10:46I just want to say one thing about this.

00:10:48As I mentioned at the beginning,

00:10:50I was a member of the group of government experts

00:10:52that put this together, but as Daniel mentioned,

00:10:55none of us at the time or since believe this is,

00:10:59that the talent manual is making law.

00:11:01It was just simply those of us who were involved

00:11:04trying to think about how the law would apply.

00:11:08And we think it's been useful.

00:11:10States have come back since the publication

00:11:12of both manuals one and two and have voiced opinions,

00:11:15which in a sense is a demonstration of our success

00:11:19because it's made states embrace the issues

00:11:23and speak up about what they do and don't think we got right.

00:11:27There is a talent manual 3.0 that will eventually come out.

00:11:30Mike Schmidt is once again working on that.

00:11:32It will not be a completely different manual

00:11:35like talent 2.0 is, but it will probably beef up

00:11:37some human rights issues and other aspects.

00:11:40It will include, incorporate more of the state feedback

00:11:43that they received based on 2.0.

00:11:47So that's what talent will do for you.

00:11:49I think it's just a good piece of gouge.

00:11:51It is not the law, but it's a good piece of gouge.

00:11:53And there are things in there that address almost

00:11:55all the things that Daniel mentioned.

00:11:56Although we, there is very little in there

00:11:59that is focused on the corporate world

00:12:03and how corporations respond to these issues

00:12:06and that may be talent manual 4.0, we'll see.

00:12:09Scott, Kurt?

00:12:13Yeah, just having worked on cyber operations

00:12:17on behalf of the Department of Defense,

00:12:19say the talent manual, we recognized that it wasn't law

00:12:22and we didn't always agree with it.

00:12:24More often than not, we did,

00:12:26but there were points where we didn't see,

00:12:28we didn't align completely at least.

00:12:30But what it did was provide a frame of reference

00:12:33where one was badly needed,

00:12:35where there were people who knew what they were talking about,

00:12:37had experience in the field,

00:12:39and they are weighing in on these issues.

00:12:41So at the very least, it provided a frame of reference

00:12:44for which the rest of us could, you know,

00:12:48even when we had a disagreement,

00:12:51you could cite to the manual and say,

00:12:54well, we disagree with this,

00:12:56but there's been a lot of thought put into it.

00:12:58And here are the places where we see differently.

00:13:01And so it's very useful to us in that regard.

00:13:04I think later on, we're going to talk about insurance

00:13:07and the talent manuals use by the insurance industry,

00:13:11where I'm not sure that it was as useful a frame of reference,

00:13:16but it was the only one available.

00:13:18And I'd say the one regret I had,

00:13:21although I certainly think there was a reason for it,

00:13:24but the one regret I had during my time at Cyber Command,

00:13:28which was eight years,

00:13:30is that the United States was not more forthcoming

00:13:32about its policies with regard to cyberspace operations

00:13:37and the law.

00:13:38The UK was-

00:13:39I thought it was brilliant of you not to me.

00:13:41I thought it was brilliant.

00:13:43That's the thing.

00:13:45As a supporter of the operators,

00:13:49I appreciated the flexibility that we were allowed

00:13:52because we had not gone on the record.

00:13:55But as an attorney, you know,

00:14:01certainty certainly would have been better

00:14:03just so that I wouldn't have to walk into

00:14:05General Nakasone's office and say, it depends.

00:14:08He appreciated that, of course,

00:14:10because it really did depend,

00:14:12but that's also a crutch that attorneys lean on

00:14:15from time to time.

00:14:17But there was a vacuum that the absence

00:14:23of more state practice created,

00:14:26that the talent manual filled,

00:14:29he also, the United States, by not coming forth on it,

00:14:32opened up a space for Russia, China,

00:14:35and others who see differently to fill that vacuum as well.

00:14:40No, that's fair, Kurt.

00:14:41And as Eric was saying,

00:14:42I mean, we're seeing more and more state practice happen

00:14:45with more countries saying how they think international law applies,

00:14:47which is, I think, useful, even if we disagree with it.

00:14:50And just a quick note, you know, for the audience,

00:14:52I think maybe if you're unfamiliar,

00:14:54it might be surprising to know just how broad,

00:14:57especially talent 2.0 is, covers a lot of related topics,

00:15:01including issues around, you know, submarine cables.

00:15:04Eric, I remember critiquing the one on space,

00:15:07that particular chapter.

00:15:08So a lot of hot topics that are useful.

00:15:10So if you haven't taken a look in a while,

00:15:12I'd encourage, you know, folks to check it out.

00:15:16Yeah, I mean, it's not a battery.

00:15:18I mean, I don't know if it's nighttime.

00:15:20Good beat reading.

00:15:21Maybe a stocking stuffer.

00:15:23Put you to sleep.

00:15:24Okay, whatever.

00:15:27Yeah.

00:15:28I mean, it's, I mean, it's, it's, it's, it's informative.

00:15:34I think it's a complicated question for the US to address

00:15:38in an operational level, given the many different theaters

00:15:42of operation under which cyber operations run.

00:15:45And then unfortunately,

00:15:46United States cyber commands here,

00:15:48and then you have the US Army here,

00:15:50and then you have Space Command,

00:15:51and then you have Wazzle Dazzle Command,

00:15:53and you have everybody.

00:15:54So that's what I call this new group I ran into.

00:16:00I call them the Wazzle Dazzle crew.

00:16:02But the point being is that there's a wide range of,

00:16:06what was it?

00:16:07National Geo satellite, whatever.

00:16:09Anyways, in the NRO and everyone else.

00:16:11But the problem I think in a lot of ways for the United States

00:16:14to sort of start defining the policy is that they first need

00:16:17to get the house organized a little bit,

00:16:20and everybody skis sort of pointing in the same direction.

00:16:23I do think that the US Cyber Command

00:16:26had a real opportunity early on to really set the tone

00:16:31and start to dictate that policy and direction.

00:16:34I think as we're not having it set by anybody,

00:16:37there are a lot of people setting the table at this point.

00:16:40That is proving to make things, unfortunately,

00:16:44a bit more complicated.

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Lesson notes

Examines how the private sector bears the brunt of cyber conflict, how the law of armed conflict and the Tallinn Manual apply, and the conflicting legal obligations multinational companies face.

Study materials

Notes, flashcards and practice questions for this lesson, reviewed before publication.

Study notes

The private sector bears the brunt of state cyber activity

In the United States, private companies carry most of the burden of defending against state-linked cyber operations. They are expected to maintain robust cybersecurity programs, but the government does not fund those defenses. When things go wrong, the board and the company are the ones that get sued, which is why preventive work with counsel matters.

Norms on critical infrastructure are not binding law

Through the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE), states agreed to 11 voluntary norms of responsible behavior, including protecting civilian critical infrastructure. Two cautions:

  • Norms do not make international law. The major powers that endorsed the critical infrastructure norm are, by many accounts, actively probing others' infrastructure. Every state wants its own infrastructure safe while holding adversaries' at risk.
  • The wording is narrower than it sounds. The GGE norm does not prohibit all attacks on critical infrastructure. It addresses activity contrary to a state's obligations under international law, so a state that believes it is acting lawfully does not see the norm as a restraint.

Earlier bilateral deals, such as the U.S.-China understanding against cyber theft of intellectual property, did not last long. Enforcement, in peacetime and wartime, is the key challenge. A new UN cybercrime convention has been adopted despite pushback from the U.S., the EU and others because of its breadth: it reaches well beyond ransomware and, in some contexts, comes close to criminalizing the use of technology itself. The panel saw it as possibly a half step back.

Which law applies: peacetime rules and the law of armed conflict

In peacetime, the rules on prohibited intervention, use of force and armed attack apply, along with human rights law, which protects individuals rather than states.

Once an armed conflict exists, an additional body of law, the law of armed conflict, overlays the peacetime rules. Armed conflict is a legal term of art: more than riots or domestic unrest. It can exist between states, or between a state and a non-state actor inside or outside its territory. Cyber operations are now part of armed conflicts in Russia-Ukraine, Israel-Palestine, Myanmar and Sudan.

Some argue the law of armed conflict cannot handle new technologies such as cyber, AI and robotics. Others, including one panelist, believe its core principles are sufficient:

  • military necessity;
  • distinction;
  • proportionality; and
  • the prohibition on unnecessary suffering.

How cyber reaches targets far from the battlefield

Cyber operations let a nation affect people and organizations not normally treated as targets, from a distance and without using armed force. A food supplier in Kansas shipping meals to troops in Ukraine, or a company making weapons components, could be disrupted in ways that have strategic impact. There is no clear answer about how the targeted company or its government may respond.

Conflicting national laws trap global companies

Multinationals are bound by the laws of each country where they operate and the country where they are incorporated, and these can conflict directly. For example, a government might demand access to a company's source code and forbid disclosure, while a U.S. government contract and DFARS requirements may make disclosure mandatory and nondisclosure a crime. Employees on the ground are caught in the middle. Some U.S. executives have reportedly been prevented from leaving China, raising concerns about coercion and access.

What the Tallinn Manual is and is not

The Tallinn Manual was written by a group of experts thinking about how existing international law applies to cyber operations. It is not law; it works more like a restatement.

  • Its success shows in the feedback it prompted: states have responded to versions 1.0 and 2.0 and voiced where they agree and disagree.
  • Version 2.0 is broad, covering topics such as submarine cables and space.
  • A Tallinn 3.0 is in progress and is expected to strengthen human rights coverage and incorporate state feedback.
  • It says little about how corporations should respond, which may be a topic for a future edition.

From a government operator's perspective, the manual was a valuable frame of reference even where the U.S. disagreed. The United States has not been very forthcoming about its own views on how international law applies in cyberspace. That gave operators flexibility, but it left a vacuum that the Tallinn Manual, and also Russia, China and others with different views, have filled. The UK has been more forthcoming. Because many U.S. commands and agencies are involved in cyber operations, the U.S. may need to align internally before it can articulate a clear policy.

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Practice quiz

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Question 1 of 6A client says the UN GGE norm protecting critical infrastructure makes state attacks on its power plants unlawful. What is the best response?
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