Legal Cyber Academy

Cyber Insurance and the War Exclusion

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Hostile or Warlike Action: Attribution and Coverage Disputes
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00:00:00But I don't know, Kurt, you want to weigh in,

00:00:04and then we can look into the cyber insurance issue here.

00:00:08Because to me, this is the real meat potatoes for the private sector.

00:00:12The problem with the private sector is cyber insurance.

00:00:15Cyber insurance has this insurance policy to cover cyber attacks,

00:00:19to protect the company from a data breach.

00:00:21It covers everything.

00:00:23If you spend enough money, you get cyber insurance

00:00:25to cover just about all your businesses and everything else.

00:00:28Even the email stupidity of wiring money out,

00:00:31you can cover it all.

00:00:33The problem isn't the coverage today.

00:00:36The real problem is you have the first party and third party,

00:00:39it covers these different things.

00:00:41But it'll cover the things, responding to the hack

00:00:44and then the impact of the other people in the hack.

00:00:48The problem is this, the war exclusion.

00:00:51The problem is that by not having a clearly defined US policy,

00:00:55it then becomes a smorgasbord of who's defining

00:00:58what a war is in cyber operations theater.

00:01:02And there are 63 different policies in the marketplace.

00:01:05I just was talking to a colleague.

00:01:07She told me there's 92 policies in the marketplace today.

00:01:10If you put the UK European markets in play,

00:01:13that is a lot of different insurance policies

00:01:16and they all define this war exclusion differently.

00:01:19And I'll let sort of the one is the war exclusion

00:01:25and then Kurt, I welcome her.

00:01:27But basically, and then Eric and Scott, right?

00:01:31But it's basically standalone and in general property

00:01:36and liability policies, they all exclude losses caused

00:01:39by war or quote, war-like actions, okay?

00:01:44Excluding war perils has been a feature

00:01:47of insurance for centuries.

00:01:49Nobody questions any of that, okay?

00:01:51Like all war remains a fundamental requirement

00:01:54in every Lloyd's and London's policy.

00:01:57Now they also exclude all of cyber wars

00:01:59or cyber operations in the Lloyd's policy as of 2022.

00:02:04The problem is for the private sector is because

00:02:06the US government didn't define any of this,

00:02:09we don't have an official policy as to what constitutes

00:02:12this cyber or war with cyber operation theater

00:02:16that's unified, right?

00:02:18You have the different groups

00:02:20that we can't quite get the same message from everybody.

00:02:24But I will let maybe Eric, then Scott and Kurt,

00:02:28you guys can weigh in here.

00:02:29Because this is where big corporations like Duke Energy

00:02:32or these other people are trying to figure out

00:02:34why do I even need to buy this?

00:02:35Like how's it going to actually help me?

00:02:38And so maybe Eric, Scott, Kurt, your thoughts here?

00:02:42Well, so I think, I mean, some of these issues

00:02:45are coming to a head, right?

00:02:46I mean, not Petya and the legal fallout,

00:02:49the cases that are being adjudicated now

00:02:51in the United States based on the war exclusion

00:02:54are going to drive some of this.

00:02:56From an academics point of view,

00:02:59war is kind of an anachronistic term now.

00:03:02I would prefer that these exclusions

00:03:04were called armed conflict exclusions

00:03:06because that's the legal term of art that we use now

00:03:10and that we can put more meat to.

00:03:12For example, there are, I can't remember the number,

00:03:15but it's more than 50 times we use the term war

00:03:19in US statutes and they mean different things

00:03:22in different statutes.

00:03:23So it's hard to know how that would apply.

00:03:27And the same is true, I think, across the insurance world

00:03:30where we need to get more legally clear terms

00:03:35other than the war exclusion.

00:03:37And then I think the other issue is,

00:03:40I don't think the insurance,

00:03:41at least the insurance people I've talked with,

00:03:43this isn't an issue of actuarial science, right?

00:03:47I mean, it's an issue of informational science.

00:03:50We've got to understand what we're covering,

00:03:52what we're not covering,

00:03:53and put legal meaning to these terms in effort

00:03:56to allow the insurance companies

00:03:58to apply the actuarial science

00:04:00to get where they need to be in terms of cost and return.

00:04:03Scott.

00:04:07No, we'll try to find more to disagree on,

00:04:09but yeah, absolutely.

00:04:11It's been a really interesting area of a lot of follow.

00:04:15I did this piece, War Games,

00:04:17that came out and I think it was Yale Law and Technology.

00:04:19This was probably, I don't know, three, four years ago now.

00:04:21And just since then, right,

00:04:23the industry has responded, the law has moved on,

00:04:26but a lot of these cases have been settling,

00:04:28at least the ones I've been following.

00:04:30So to the point that's been made,

00:04:32we don't have a lot of great precedent yet

00:04:34to hang our hats on about how we're defining these key terms.

00:04:37So that's why I remember the talent manual.

00:04:40I think it was maybe rule 11, Eric,

00:04:42about the use of cyber operations

00:04:44when the constant use of force.

00:04:46So I think making sure that the insurance industry

00:04:49can be as specific as possible is going to be part of the answer here,

00:04:53even around the hostile acts language.

00:04:57The role of, of course, government attribution comes up a lot,

00:05:00like we saw in NotPetya, right?

00:05:02Because when it's the US government fingering a foreign country,

00:05:04that's going to give extra fodder to the argument

00:05:07for why this should be considered,

00:05:09a hostile act or armed attack,

00:05:12and the coverage shouldn't apply.

00:05:14So I think, to the extent possible,

00:05:16the insurance industry pivoting from that,

00:05:19being much more specific about the types of things,

00:05:23differentiating, for example, between a phishing scheme,

00:05:28maybe involving AI these days,

00:05:30or like a full bore ransomware attack

00:05:33that was really at the behest of something like

00:05:35the government of North Korea.

00:05:37I think that's going to be an important step too.

00:05:39And then lastly, just noting that this is kind of anecdotal,

00:05:43but we just did a survey for the,

00:05:45the Indiana Executive Council on Cybersecurity.

00:05:49So we basically asked, you know,

00:05:50hundreds of companies and critical infrastructure providers

00:05:53across the state, starting back in 2020,

00:05:55but we just redid it for 2024.

00:05:58Lots of questions, including my insurance coverage,

00:06:00and because of the increase in costs of insurance

00:06:03and because of these exclusions that we're talking about,

00:06:06my hypothesis going in is that we would have seen

00:06:08a bit of a decline in insurance coverage,

00:06:11but actually, at least in Indiana over the last four years,

00:06:14we saw an uptick.

00:06:15So we're up to more than 60% of organizations participating

00:06:19here that reported having cyber risk insurance coverage.

00:06:23Wow.

00:06:24I think there's still some confusion about what it covers.

00:06:26Does it cover trade secrets, you know, for example, or not?

00:06:29But I was surprised by that finding.

00:06:32That's really interesting, Scott.

00:06:33That's really interesting.

00:06:35Yeah.

00:06:36Insurance is meant to give confidence and certainty,

00:06:41and I'm afraid in this space, it just really hasn't yet.

00:06:45First of all, the war exclusion,

00:06:48as you can read on the slide right here,

00:06:50the definition includes far more than more.

00:06:53So it's a labeling issue where, you know,

00:06:56if you take that you just had to slide up

00:06:59for the Merck case, Daniel, you know,

00:07:03if you think about what happened in that case related to war,

00:07:07it seems kind of ridiculous that it would apply.

00:07:09But when you look at the broader definition...

00:07:12It really did apply.

00:07:14Yeah, it did.

00:07:15So...

00:07:16I mean, I bet you don't care to threaten what happened there,

00:07:19because let me tell you, not only did it apply,

00:07:21but it applied in a way that the state of New Jersey,

00:07:24at least, has a fairly adverse impact on anybody

00:07:28that is actually litigating a coverage issue

00:07:32or dispute because at the most practical level,

00:07:36they entered a confidential settlement,

00:07:38but I mean, the ruling still stands.

00:07:40I mean, the court basically said it didn't use the word cyber

00:07:44and therefore wasn't applicable.

00:07:46And I'm like, okay.

00:07:48So in lieu of labeling it war

00:07:51and trying to fit it under that definition,

00:07:54a lot of these policies, at least the ones I've seen,

00:07:57they tried to rely on attribution

00:08:00to a nation state actor

00:08:02and say when it's a nation state actor acting

00:08:05that your harm is excluded then.

00:08:09However, it's hard to attribute in cyberspace.

00:08:13It's hard to discover who's actually behind something.

00:08:16You can discover perhaps the nation

00:08:19where your malicious cyber actor was,

00:08:21but that doesn't necessarily mean

00:08:23the government was behind it.

00:08:24And even if you get, say, someone in the...

00:08:29In any national government with a authority

00:08:33and understanding of cyberspace operations,

00:08:36even if they verify publicly

00:08:38that there was a nation state behind a certain operation,

00:08:43I would be perfectly happy

00:08:45even having worked for the government.

00:08:47But if I was the counsel in a case like that at trial,

00:08:50I would be perfectly happy to point out

00:08:52the government's lie sometimes

00:08:54that wouldn't necessarily rely on statements.

00:08:57Not lie, they just confuse facts and fiction.

00:09:01Yeah.

00:09:02So if you're relying on attribution

00:09:04to provide your distinguishing variable,

00:09:07it's going to be difficult to...

00:09:10To me, the most interesting...

00:09:12I was talking to somebody I know

00:09:14that was really involved in this case,

00:09:16and the most interesting thing about it

00:09:18at a practical level

00:09:21is that when you look at what played out

00:09:23and how it played out, right, it's 2017.

00:09:26So now this is seven years later.

00:09:28We're in 2024, right?

00:09:30And so they modified all the policy languages.

00:09:32This will never be an issue again, right?

00:09:35The carriers have addressed this issue with prejudice.

00:09:39But I think at the most practical level,

00:09:41what it's most telling to me isn't that,

00:09:44but it's about the language of hostile or warlike action

00:09:48because you still see the phrase in cyber policies.

00:09:53And the problem I have with all of this, right,

00:09:56because when you start looking at the recent trends, right,

00:10:00as we're heading towards the Spanish line here,

00:10:03like with Ukraine and Israel and right, you know,

00:10:08like where does it trigger, you know,

00:10:11the Israel-Hamas conflict according to David Fence,

00:10:14who's the alliance specialty claims.

00:10:16And, you know, he says, you know,

00:10:19we cannot definitively say that events are rising out.

00:10:22And I know David, the current Israel-Hamas conflict

00:10:25could trigger the war exclusion,

00:10:27but it would need to cross several hurdles

00:10:30for it to apply to the U.S. business.

00:10:33Well, let me tell you, Ukrainian one, you know,

00:10:37I don't know.

00:10:39To me, like as we're looking at all of these things,

00:10:41there's no question there's hostile warlike operations

00:10:44going on, right?

00:10:47I don't quite get how the exclusions don't apply, right?

00:10:51If you're a U.S.-based interest

00:10:53and you get hacked by and collateral damage,

00:10:56I mean, I don't see it.

00:10:58I mean, maybe I'm daft here,

00:11:01but you run a, you use Ukrainian outsource developers.

00:11:08They get hit by a Russian cyber attack.

00:11:13They're offline.

00:11:14You can't deliver your product.

00:11:15You can't ship the product.

00:11:17Or you use Ukrainian software manufacturer

00:11:20to support your manufacturing technology stack.

00:11:26They get hit by the Russian hackers.

00:11:30I don't see how the exclusion,

00:11:33and that in turn impairs your ability to go to market.

00:11:36I don't get how the exclusion doesn't really apply,

00:11:39but I know that there are currently claims in the market

00:11:42where as a mediator,

00:11:45I am mediating coverage disputes here

00:11:48arising out of these issues and conflicts

00:11:51because the policies are written with this right here,

00:11:55this phrase, where to go, hostile or warlike action.

Automatically generated; it may contain errors.

Lesson notes

Explains how the war exclusion in cyber insurance works, why policies define it differently, and why the lack of a clear policy definition leaves businesses unsure of their coverage.

Study materials

Notes, flashcards and practice questions for this lesson, reviewed before publication.

Study notes

What cyber insurance covers, and where the real problem lies

Cyber insurance can cover a great deal: first-party costs of responding to a hack, third-party liability for harm to others, and even losses from fraudulent wire transfers triggered by email schemes. With enough premium, a company can insure most of its exposure. The problem is not the breadth of coverage. It is the war exclusion.

Property, liability and standalone cyber policies traditionally exclude losses caused by war or "warlike" action. War exclusions have been part of insurance for centuries and are not controversial in themselves. The difficulty is applying them to cyber operations:

  • The U.S. government has no single, unified policy defining when cyber operations amount to war.
  • Many different policy forms are in the market, in the U.S., the UK and Europe, and they define the exclusion differently.
  • Lloyd's market policies began excluding cyber war or state-backed cyber operations as of 2022.

Large companies are left asking why they should buy coverage at all if a major state-linked attack might be excluded.

Why "war" is a poor term and what could replace it

From an academic perspective, "war" is an anachronistic legal term. Armed conflict is the modern term of art and carries clearer legal meaning. U.S. statutes use "war" many times with different meanings, so importing it into insurance creates confusion. The challenge is less about actuarial science than information science: insurers need clear legal definitions of what they cover before they can price the risk.

The panel's suggestions for the industry:

  • Use more precise terms, including in "hostile acts" language.
  • Distinguish between different kinds of events, such as a phishing scheme, possibly AI-enabled, versus a full-scale ransomware attack carried out at the behest of a government such as North Korea.
  • Draw on international law sources, such as the Tallinn Manual's treatment of when cyber operations amount to a use of force.

Many coverage cases have settled, so there is little precedent defining the key terms.

The NotPetya coverage litigation and its aftermath

The NotPetya attack in 2017 produced litigation over whether war exclusions applied. In Merck's case, the New Jersey court ruled that the exclusion did not apply because it did not use the word cyber. The parties later reached a confidential settlement, but the ruling stands, which affects anyone litigating a coverage dispute in New Jersey. Carriers have since rewritten policy language to address the issue, but the phrase "hostile or warlike action" still appears in cyber policies.

Attribution as the deciding variable

Many policies now rely on attribution to a nation-state actor to trigger the exclusion. That creates its own problems:

  • Attribution in cyberspace is hard. Investigators may identify the country where an actor operated without proving the government was behind it.
  • Government attribution, as with NotPetya, gives insurers extra ammunition to argue an event was a hostile act or armed attack.
  • Even a public government attribution can be challenged at trial, because governments sometimes blur fact and assessment.

Current conflicts and collateral damage

Ongoing conflicts, such as Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas, raise live questions. Industry voices have suggested such conflicts could trigger war exclusions only after clearing several hurdles for a U.S. business. But consider a U.S. company that relies on Ukrainian outsourced developers or a Ukrainian software vendor that is knocked offline by a Russian attack, preventing the company from shipping products. Whether the exclusion applies is unclear, and coverage disputes arising from these conflicts are already being mediated because policies use the "hostile or warlike action" phrasing.

Coverage trends and confusion

Despite rising costs and new exclusions, a survey of Indiana organizations and critical infrastructure providers found that more than 60% reported having cyber risk insurance by 2024, an increase over four years. Confusion remains about what policies cover, such as whether trade secret losses are included. Insurance is meant to provide confidence and certainty, and in this space it has not yet done so.

Flashcards

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Practice quiz

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Question 1 of 6A board asks why cyber coverage may fail after a major state-linked attack. What is the best answer?
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