International Law: Intervention, Use of Force, and Armed Attack
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Private-Sector Exposure and the Tallinn ManualTranscriptThe player shows YouTube’s automatic captions, which are machine captions we do not review. The full transcript is below.
00:00:00Well, I'll just hit these bullets,
00:00:02and then I'll let others kick in,
00:00:04but so the UN Charter is the basis
00:00:06for international peace and security law
00:00:08as a matter of international law.
00:00:10If you want me to go down to it, here it is.
00:00:12Yeah, why not?
00:00:13And it prohibits, well,
00:00:15so before we get to Article 51,
00:00:16it prohibits in Article 2, sub 4,
00:00:19the use or threat of force, right?
00:00:22And then there's also this customary law doctrine
00:00:25of prohibited intervention,
00:00:26which is where most of this play actually happens.
00:00:29What prohibited intervention says is,
00:00:31it is unlawful, you see this,
00:00:32that's the third bullet here,
00:00:34prohibited intervention says,
00:00:35it is unlawful for you to, as a state,
00:00:39to intervene in the domain reservoir,
00:00:43meaning some inherently government functions of a country.
00:00:46That's unlawful under international law.
00:00:49It's even more unlawful, I guess is one way to say it,
00:00:52if you use force, threat or use force,
00:00:54and that's Article 2, sub 4.
00:00:56The response to that is what Daniel has on this slide
00:00:58as the top slide, which is armed attack.
00:01:01If your prohibited intervention or your use of force
00:01:04amounts to what is a legal term of art
00:01:07that is an armed attack,
00:01:09then that gives you a state, the victim state,
00:01:12the right to engage in self-defense,
00:01:15both cyber and kinetic self-defense
00:01:17in response to a cyber event.
00:01:20Now, there has never been in the history of the world
00:01:23an event, this includes things like Stuxnet,
00:01:27this includes things like Saudi Aramco,
00:01:29this includes things like Sands Hotel,
00:01:31this includes things like,
00:01:32I mean, all of the events you can think of,
00:01:35Colonial Pipeline,
00:01:36and no state government has ever said,
00:01:39hey, we were victims of an armed attack
00:01:42by cyber means giving us the opportunity
00:01:44to respond to self-defense.
00:01:45Nobody has said that.
00:01:46No state has even said
00:01:49that this was an official government statement
00:01:52saying that cyber thing was a use of force.
00:01:55There are states out there now who are saying things like,
00:01:58if you do this, we will consider it as a use of force,
00:02:01like for example, France and some others have talked about
00:02:04economic interference or intervention,
00:02:07but no one is saying that thing is a use of force.
00:02:10So that is problematic for us as we try and look at
00:02:14how do we characterize these events
00:02:16and how do we as governments
00:02:17prepare to respond to these events.
00:02:19So, Kurt and Scott, I'll let you jump in there.
00:02:22I don't mean to monopolize this conversation.
00:02:26No, it's excellent.
00:02:27I mean, well done, Eric.
00:02:28I'm so glad we started with you.
00:02:30Again, there's differing views,
00:02:32as Eric was describing here,
00:02:34around how armed attack and use of force
00:02:36characterize in the U.S.
00:02:37versus even among our NATO allies,
00:02:39and then more broadly.
00:02:41I think it's one of those interesting,
00:02:43yeah, no, thanks.
00:02:44It's one of those interesting areas
00:02:46where we've definitely seen clarification
00:02:48as we'll talk more about,
00:02:50at least from my standpoint,
00:02:51above the armed attack threshold
00:02:52for how some of the relevant international law applies here.
00:02:55I think that low intensity cyber conflict
00:02:57that we're dealing with day in, day out,
00:02:59as Daniel was describing at the beginning,
00:03:01whether we classify it as actually cyber war or not, right?
00:03:04I think we can all agree
00:03:06there's constantly low intensity conflict
00:03:09that's playing out,
00:03:10and their response to that,
00:03:12how we attribute cyber attacks, right?
00:03:14How we think about what role sanctions should play,
00:03:17how we think about preemptive use of kinetic
00:03:21or cyber means in response to known threats.
00:03:23All that's coming into play
00:03:24and is definitely putting the private sector,
00:03:26again, on those front lines, right?
00:03:28Because a lot of these are critical infrastructure scenarios.
00:03:31And we can also talk about,
00:03:33below that threshold,
00:03:34some recent developments.
00:03:35Paul and Daniel, if you'd like to,
00:03:36including that recent,
00:03:37quite contentious new cyber crime convention
00:03:40that comes into play here a bit too.
00:03:42Yeah, the UN convention, right?
00:03:43Great points, Scott.
00:03:44Mm-hmm.
00:03:45There we go.
00:03:46Do you want to do that now?
00:03:47The international law wasn't designed to...
00:03:50Okay, Kurt, yeah.
00:03:51Well, it was designed to protect
00:03:53against the worst perils
00:03:55that armed conflict visits on people,
00:03:58the death, injury, and destruction.
00:04:01It wasn't designed for this type of competition or conflict.
00:04:06It happens at a much lower level.
00:04:08These tools, these cyber operational tools
00:04:11could be used someday to cause death and destruction,
00:04:15but so far they haven't.
00:04:16And that's why they're valuable to nations
00:04:18and especially to those acting asymmetrically
00:04:22is that they can achieve strategic effect
00:04:25without crossing a line
00:04:28that would allow the victim to use force in response.
00:04:31And that's why they present such great power
00:04:34to these adversaries.
00:04:36And it's an interesting dynamic
00:04:38because the relationship between the state
00:04:41and the private sector...
00:04:43Scott, and this is something that I've come to appreciate
00:04:46about international law,
00:04:48and I've only done it really from the private sector side,
00:04:51but effectively, if you think about it at a practical level,
00:04:57private sector in the United States doesn't work actively
00:05:00with the NSA to go out and steal other people's secrets
00:05:03and cause harm to other countries' corporations.
00:05:05It just doesn't, right?
00:05:07And other countries in the world,
00:05:09that is normal standard course of operation, right?
00:05:13It is status quo for operating, right?
00:05:16So you have a national governmental agency
00:05:18that is effectively working
00:05:20as an extension of a private corporation
00:05:23to low-intensity cyber conflict.
00:05:26As Kirk pointed out, the law, international law,
00:05:29isn't really constructed to do this, right?
00:05:32To me, the irony is they've created these treaties.
00:05:35The Biden administration passed this
00:05:3764-no-ransomware-power-out-don't-pay thing,
00:05:40but the problem is the countries
00:05:42that really need to be members to it aren't,
00:05:45and they're the ones collecting the money
00:05:48off of the ransomware.
00:05:49So even if we don't pay it, right,
00:05:51I was dealing with a ransomware situation
00:05:53a week ago where they had backups
00:05:56and they didn't pay the ransomware,
00:05:57so they went after the CEO's daughter, right?
00:06:01And so there's an escalation
00:06:04by the cyber operators to collect the money.
00:06:08But I think it and fund their state operations
00:06:12and what they're seeking.
00:06:13But the challenging part is the UN, right,
00:06:16and this governmental group of experts,
00:06:19and, you know, there's the new,
00:06:21I didn't put it in here,
00:06:22that whole new charter and whatever.
00:06:24But the larvam conflict, right,
00:06:26and then all that,
00:06:27Professor Jensen and then Scott and Kurt,
00:06:30you've got to play in, right?
00:06:31It was never intended for if Iran,
00:06:34that nobody envisioned when it was made
00:06:36that someone would run a drone attack,
00:06:38launch a DDoS, denial of service attack,
00:06:41or, you know, run a mass casualty event
00:06:44and then jam everybody's cell phone signals
00:06:46when they come in so that you can then launch a,
00:06:49you know, a mobile bomb or a pager attack
00:06:52or whatever, right?
00:06:53I mean, nobody was envisioning weaponizing the pagers
00:06:57into the general population, right?
00:06:59I mean, it wasn't at the time
00:07:01of international loss construction
00:07:03that, you know, there was bullets, missiles, bombs,
00:07:07maybe some bazookas and grenades.
00:07:10But I don't know, Professor Jensen,
00:07:12you want to weigh in here, right?
00:07:13I mean, like, and yes, if you're in a conflict,
00:07:17you're right to respond and retort you
00:07:19and all these things and, you know, responding and et cetera
00:07:22are, and different countries have different things.
Automatically generated; it may contain errors.
Lesson notes
Explains prohibited intervention and the UN Charter's bar on the threat or use of force, and why armed attack is the threshold for self-defense, including how poorly existing law fits cyber operations.
Study materials
Notes, flashcards and practice questions for this lesson, reviewed before publication.
Study notes
The UN Charter framework for cyber operations
The UN Charter is the foundation of international peace and security law, and three concepts structure how it applies to cyber operations:
- Prohibited intervention. Customary international law makes it unlawful for a state to intervene in another state's domaine réservé, its inherently governmental functions. Most real-world cyber activity plays out at this level.
- Use or threat of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits the use or threat of force. Intervention that involves force is a more serious violation.
- Armed attack. If an intervention or use of force rises to an "armed attack," a legal term of art, the victim state gains the right of self-defense under Article 51. That response may be cyber or kinetic, even when the triggering event was a cyber operation.
No state has yet called a cyber event an armed attack
No state has ever officially declared that it was the victim of an armed attack by cyber means that justified self-defense. That holds for well-known incidents such as Stuxnet, the attack on Saudi Aramco, the Sands Hotel attack and Colonial Pipeline. No state has even issued an official statement that a particular cyber incident was a use of force. Some states, such as France, have said they would treat certain conduct, including economic interference, as crossing lines, but none has applied the label to an actual event.
That gap makes it hard to characterize incidents and to plan government responses. Views differ on where the thresholds sit, between the United States and its NATO allies and more broadly. There has been more clarity on how law applies above the armed attack threshold than below it.
Low-intensity conflict below the threshold
Most cyber activity is constant, low-intensity conflict, whether or not anyone calls it cyber war. Key issues include:
- how cyber attacks are attributed;
- what role sanctions should play; and
- whether preemptive cyber or kinetic action against known threats is permissible.
Because much of the targeted infrastructure is privately owned, the private sector sits on the front lines. Below the threshold, a new UN cybercrime convention has been contentious.
Why international law struggles with cyber competition
The law of armed conflict was designed to protect people from the worst perils of war: death, injury and destruction. It was not designed for this kind of lower-level competition. Cyber tools could someday cause death and destruction, but so far they generally have not. That is precisely their value to states, especially those acting asymmetrically: they can achieve strategic effects without crossing a line that would allow the victim to respond with force.
The drafters also did not anticipate hybrid tactics, such as combining a drone strike with a denial-of-service attack, jamming cell signals during a mass casualty event, or weaponizing devices like pagers carried by the general population. The law was built around bullets, missiles and bombs.
State and private-sector roles differ across countries
In the United States, private companies do not work with intelligence agencies to steal other countries' corporate secrets. In some other countries, national agencies effectively act as an extension of private corporations in low-intensity cyber conflict. International law is not built for that dynamic.
Ransomware and the limits of collective pledges
The United States has led an international coalition committing not to pay ransoms. The problem is that the countries that most need to join are not members, and some of them profit from ransomware, which can fund state operations. Even when victims refuse to pay because they have backups, operators may escalate. In one recent case, after a company with good backups refused to pay, the attackers targeted the CEO's daughter.
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